Why is Germany's AfD gaining in the polls?
Immigration is a flow and a stock issue - the latter is what's driving the rise of the AfD
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There’s many things that threaten Europe’s medium-term stability, including its shamefully weak response to Russia after its invasion of Ukraine and the fact that many countries have run out of fiscal space. But all that stuff pales in comparison to the political apocalypse that’s unfolding in Germany. The AfD got 20.8 percent of the vote in the February 2025 election. It now stands at 29 percent in the polls.
The fact that its popularity is rising so fast is a political earthquake for Europe. Will a Germany with AfD in power defend the Baltics or Poland should Russia attack? Given its pro-Russia leanings, that’s an open question. Will the AfD pull Germany out of the Euro once in power? The AfD got its start as an anti-Euro party in 2013, so this is also on the menu. There is, in short, nothing more systemic or urgent in Europe right now.
The single most important question is what’s driving rising AfD popularity. Maybe Germany’s decade-long economic slump or the “Grand Coalition” of the CDU and SPD play a role, but they’re not the main driver. Instead, the main driver in my view is deep dissatisfaction among voters over immigration. When I make this point to folks, they usually push back, saying immigration is down a lot from just a few years ago. That’s true, but immigration is a stock and a flow issue. Even if you take the “flow” of new immigrants down to zero, that still leaves the cumulative effects of past immigration flows in the form of a large, foreign-born population. It’s this “stock” that voters see and this is what in my view is fueling the rapid rise of the AfD.
The chart above shows annual net migration of foreigners into Germany from 2010 through 2026. I’ve grossed up monthly flows for January and February to create an annual estimate for 2026. What’s clear is that the pace of the immigration “flow” has slowed a lot. This is the main argument I hear for why immigration can’t be behind the recent rise in AfD popularity. That’s wrong for two reasons. First, the reduced flow is partly just an accident and stems from the fact that there’s currently no crisis like Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (2022) or civil war in Syria (2015). The CDU and SPD “Grand Coalition” just doesn’t deserve much credit for the recent slowing. Second, the series in the chart is the net between foreign in- and outflows. The fact that the bars are never negative means people who apply for temporary asylum gain de facto permanent residency. Which brings us to the “stock” issue.
The chart above shows annual data for the foreign-born population from non-EU countries in percent of the total population for Germany (blue), Spain (red), France (purple), Italy (green), the Netherlands (orange) and Sweden (black). There’s a steady trend up in all of these places, with Germany seeing especially rapid increases after 2015 and 2022. It’s this “stock” issue that’s driving the rapid rise in AfD popularity and this will continue regardless of how well-behaved the immigration “flow” is. If the CDU and SPD want to halt the rise of the AfD, this is what they need to confront.
I think the stock vs flow point matters a lot.
People often argue that immigration is down, so it cannot be the driver anymore. But politically, voters don’t experience only the latest flow. They experience the accumulated pressure around schools, housing, public services, neighbourhood change, and trust in the state.
In that sense the reaction can keep building even after the flow has slowed.
The AfD’s rise cannot be explained by immigration statistics alone. The real issue is decades of wage stagnation, housing shortages, public-sector decline and growing inequality. Instead of confronting the economic failures that benefit capital, elites redirect frustration toward migrants. The far right feeds on social insecurity, but migrants did not create Germany’s crises. Scapegoating is easier than challenging the system that produced them.
Germany has already learned where nationalism, ethnic blame and far-right politics lead. History did not end well in 1945 and repeating the same logic with new targets will not end well today either.